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The Senate Has No Constitutional Obligation to 
Consider Nominees 
 
Jonathan H. Adler* 
 
 Justice Antonin Scalia’s tragic and unexpected death sent 
shockwaves through the American legal community.1 Few justices to sit on 
the Supreme Court have had as great an impact.2 Justice Scalia’s death also 
reignited the judicial confirmation wars. Conflict over judicial nominations 
had been smoldering,3 but burst into flames once it became clear that 
President Obama would have the opportunity to nominate Justice Scalia’s 
successor and, just prior to a presidential election, dramatically alter the 
ideological and doctrinal balance on the Court.4  
Within hours of Justice Scalia’s death, Senate Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell preemptively announced that he would not allow a vote 
                                                 
* Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law & Regulation, 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The author thanks Michael Ramsey and Alan Meese 
for helpful comments and Shannon Meyer for research assistance. Any remaining errors, omissions or 
inanities are solely the fault of the author. 
1 See Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0; Robert Barnes, Supreme 
Court Justice Antonin Scalia Dies at 79, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2010, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-
79/2016/02/13/effe8184-a62f-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html; see also Richard Wolf, At Supreme 
Court, Justice Antonin Scalia's impact still felt, USA TODAY, (May 9, 2016), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/05/09/supreme-court-antonin-scalia-death-cases-
decisions/83892680/. 
2 See William Kelly, Scalia's lasting impact on the Supreme Court, CNBC, (Feb. 14, 2016, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/14/scalias-lasting-impact-on-the-supreme-court-commentary.html; How 
Antonin Scalia Changed America, POLITICO, (Feb. 14, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/02/antonin-scalia-how-he-changed-america-213631; 
Jeffery Rosen. What Made Antonin Scalia Great, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 15, 2016, 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/02/antonin-scalia-how-he-changed-america-213631; Ilya 
Shapiro, Scalia will be impossible to replace, CNN, (Feb. 15, 2016, 8:53 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/15/opinions/scalia-impossible-to-replace-shapiro/. 
3 See, e.g., Russell Wheeler, Confirming federal judges during the final two years of the Obama 
administration: Vacancies up, nominees down, BROOKINGS (Sept. 18, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/08/18-obama-federal-judges-confirmation-wheeler. 
4 See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Appointment Could Reshape American Life, N.Y. TIMES, FEB. 18, 
2016 (discussing potential impact of Justice Scalia’s replacement); see also, Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Conservative Era of the Supreme Court is Over, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2016, 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-chemerinsky-end-of-conservative-supreme-court-
20160628-snap-story.html. 
 While replacing Justice Scalia with a justice appointed by a Democratic President would 
certainly have an effect on politically charged areas of the law in which the Court has recently split 5-4, 
it would also likely have an effect where the Court split 5-4 along non-traditional lines, such as criminal 
procedure, where Justice Scalia often voted for more “liberal” outcomes. See, e.g., Kevin Ring, Antonin 
Scalia Was a Great Jurist for Criminal Defendants, REASON, Feb. 16, 2016, 
http://reason.com/archives/2016/02/16/antonin-scalia-was-a-great-jurist-for-cr; Robert J. Smith, Antonin 
Scalia’s Other Legacy, SLATE, Feb. 15, 2016, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/antonin_scalia_was_often_a_fri
end_of_criminal_defendants.html. 
 
 
Adler – No Obligation – GEO. MASON L. REV. 
on a nomination to replace Justice Scalia prior to the election of a new 
President.5 If the balance of the Supreme Court is to be altered, Senator 
McConnell and his allies declared, it should only occur after an intervening 
election in which the American electorate has the opportunity to consider 
what sort of change they would like to see on the Court.6  
 In response to the Senate Republican leadership’s stated intention 
to refuse to consider any nominee to replace Justice Scalia, some began to 
argue that the Senate has a constitutional obligation to act on a Supreme 
Court nomination.7 The progressive Alliance for Justice, for example, 
circulated a letter signed by more than 350 law professors arguing the 
Senate has a “constitutional duty” to provide a hearing and vote on a 
nominee to the Supreme Court.8 This “obligation” is “clear,” the letter 
                                                 
5 See Sen. Mitch McConnell, Justice Antonin Scalia, (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news?YearDisplay=2016&MonthDisplay=2&page=
6; see also Susan Davis, Scalia's Death Will Cast A Long Shadow Across This Year's Senate Races, 
NPR, Feb. 15, 2016, 6:04 AM, http://www.npr.org/2016/02/15/466735802/scalia-s-death-and-the-2016-
senate-races (“Within hours of Justice Antonin Scalia's death, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 
aimed to squash any expectation that President Obama will get to name his successor.”). 
6 See McConnell, supra note __ (“The American people should have a voice in the selection of their 
next Supreme Court Justice. Therefore, this vacancy should not be filled until we have a new 
President.”); see also Orrin Hatch, The Senate Is Justified in Waiting to Confirm a Supreme Court 
Nominee, NATIONAL REVIEW, (April 4, 2016 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/433570/merrick-garland-nomination-threatens-separation-
powers.  
7 See, See, e.g., David H. Gans, Republicans Who Block Obama’s Supreme Court Pick Are Violating the 
Constitution, NEW REPUBLIC, (March 16, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/131700/republicans-
block-obamas-supreme-court-pick-violating-constitution (“The claims made by these senators that they 
can fulfill their ‘advice and consent’ responsibilities under the Constitution by doing nothing cannot be 
squared with the Constitution’s text and history. The Constitution requires the president and Senate to 
work together to ensure a fully functioning Supreme Court.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Do the Right Thing: 
Obstruction of Supreme Court Nominee Sets a Disastrous Precedent for the Future, American 
Constitution Society Blog, (March 9, 2016), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/do-the-right-thing-
obstruction-of-supreme-court-nominee-sets-a-disastrous-precedent-for-the; Nanya Springer, Leading 
Constitutional Law Scholar Explains the Supreme Court Vacancy, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, 
(Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/leading-constitutional-law-scholar-explains-the-
supreme-court-vacancy (quoting Erwin Chermerinsky saying, “So, the Constitution creates a duty for 
the president to appoint Supreme Court justices by using the word ‘shall.’ There is no clause in Article 
II that says, ‘but not in an election year.’”); Sen. Harry Reid, Considering Merrick Garland’s SC 
nomination, ASIAN JOURNAL, (Apr. 7, 2016), http://asianjournal.com/editorial/considering-merrick-
garlands-sc-nomination/. (“The Constitution does not exempt Senators from doing their jobs because it 
is an election year or because they don’t like the President.”). 
8 The AFJ letter reads, in part: 
As scholars deeply committed to the fair administration of justice, upholding the rule of law, 
and educating future generations of the legal profession, the undersigned professors of law 
urge you to fulfill your constitutional duty to give President Barack Obama’s Supreme Court 
nominee a prompt and fair hearing and a timely vote. 
The Senate’s obligation in this circumstance is clear. Under Article II of the Constitution, the 
president “shall appoint . . . judges to the Supreme Court,” and the Senate’s role is to provide 
“advice and consent.” Yet before the president has even made a nomination to fill the current 
vacancy, a number of senators have announced that they will not perform their constitutional 
duty. Instead, they plan to withhold advice and consent until the next president is sworn in 
nearly a year from now. This preemptive abdication of duty is contrary to the process the 
framers envisioned in Article II, and threatens to diminish the integrity of our democratic 
institutions and the functioning of our constitutional government. 
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proclaimed. Harvard Law School Dean Martha Minow and Pepperdine 
School of Law Dean (and former judge) Deanell Tacha made a similar 
argument in the Boston Globe.9 Vice President Joseph Biden also took to 
the op-ed pages to argue the Senate has a “constitutional obligation” to act 
on a Supreme Court nomination, and that fulfilling this “constitutional 
responsibility” requires “considering, debating, and voting on that 
nominee” on the floor of the Senate.10 President Obama, for his part, 
proclaimed “I have fulfilled my constitutional duty. Now it’s time for the 
Senate to do theirs.”11 
The argument that the Senate has a constitutional obligation to act 
on a Supreme Court nomination is anything but “clear.”12 This claim finds 
no support in the relevant constitutional text, constitutional structure, or the 
history of judicial nominations. While there are strong policy and 
prudential arguments that the Senate should promptly consider any and all 
nominations to legislatively authorized seats on the federal bench, and on 
the Supreme Court in particular, the argument that the Senate has some sort 
of constitutional obligation to take specific actions in response to a judicial 
nomination is erroneous. Interestingly enough, the argument that the Senate 
has an obligation to consider judicial nominations is not new. In the face of 
Senate intransigence on some of his judicial nominees, President George 
W. Bush declared that: “The Senate has a constitutional obligation to vote 
                                                 
Over 350 law professors urge senators to fulfill their constitutional duty, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, 
(March 7, 2016), http://www.afj.org/press-room/press-releases/over-350-law-professors-urge-senators-
to-fulfill-their-constitutional-duty. 
9 The article reads in part: 
Article II of the Constitution is not ambiguous. It directs that the president “shall nominate, 
and by and with the advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . judges of the 
Supreme Court.” The senators swore their oath to the Constitution. An orderly process, 
adhering to these words of the Constitution, is not only what the law requires; it is essential 
to preserving the treasure that is our independent judiciary and rule of law. 
Martha Minow and Deanell Tacha, Op-Ed, US needs a government of laws, not people, BOSTON 
GLOBE, (March 22, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/03/21/needs-government-laws-
not-people/34oNmHmUH3TYEIbtXCQylM/story.html. 
10 Joseph R. Biden Jr., Joe Biden: The Senate’s Duty on a Supreme Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, (March 
3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/opinion/joe-biden-the-senates-duty-to-advise-and-
consent.html. 
11 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President Announcing Judge Merrick Garland as his 
Nominee to the Supreme Court (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/03/16/remarks-president-announcing-judge-merrick-garland-his-nominee-supreme. 
12 For arguments against the idea that there is a constitutional duty to consider Supreme Court 
nominations, see, e.g., Vikram David Amar, The Grave Risks of the Senate Republicans’ Stated Refusal 
to Process any Supreme Court Nominee President Obama Sends Them, JUSTIA, (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/02/26/the-grave-risks-of-the-senate-republicans-stated-refusal-to-
process-any-supreme-court-nominee-president-obama-sends-them; Noah Feldman, Obama and 
Republicans Are Both Wrong About Constitution, BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 17, 2016 12:21 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-17/obama-and-senate-are-both-wrong-about-the-
constitution; Adam White, The Ginsburg Affair, CITY J., Aug. 4, 2016, http://www.city-
journal.org/html/ginsburg-affair-14679.html; see also Lana Ulrich, Tracking the controversy over Judge 
Garland’s nomination, CONSTITUTION CENTER, (May 27, 2016), 
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2016/05/tracking-the-controversy-over-judge-garlands-nomination/. 
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up or down on a President’s judicial nominees.”13 The argument was wrong 
then, and it is wrong now. 
Senator McConnell’s announcement of across-the-board opposition 
to any Supreme Court nominee undoubtedly escalated partisan conflict over 
judicial confirmations. There are many powerful arguments that such 
reflexive opposition is unwise and imprudent, and threatens to further 
undermine the functioning and independence of the federal judiciary.14 
These arguments do not, however establish that refusal to consider the 
nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to replace Justice Scalia is 
unconstitutional. 
 
I. TEXT 
 
 Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides for 
the appointment of federal judges. It reads, in relevant part: 
 
The President . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges 
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law . . . 15 
 
This provision creates a three-part appointment process for federal judges 
(including justices to the Supreme Court).16 First, the President nominates. 
Second, the Senate provides advice and consent. Third, providing Senate 
consent has been forthcoming, the President then makes the appointment.  
This process applies to Supreme Court justices, but it also applies to all 
other principal officers, ambassadors, and lower court judges.17 The text 
itself makes no distinction among the various appointments covered by the 
clause. Further, nothing in this text imposes an affirmative obligation on the 
Senate to take any specific steps with regard to presidential nominees to the 
Supreme Court, let alone to hold hearings or a vote on the floor.18  
                                                 
13 Press Release, President George W. Bush, Statement on Judicial Nominations (Dec. 23, 2004). 
President Bush as hardly the first President to claim the Senate was obligated to act on presidential 
nominations. In 1789, President John Adams wrote that “the whole Senate must now deliberate on 
every appointment.” John Adams, Letter to Roger Sherman, 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 432 
(Charles Francis Adams, 1850-56), available at: http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_2_2-3s45.html  
14 See, e.g., Amar, supra note __ (noting opposition to considering a nominee could backfire and 
escalate conflict over nominations).  
15 U.S. Const., art II, §2. 
16 See Appointment of a Senate-Confirmed Nominee, 23 Op. O.L.C. 232, 232, 1999 WL 33495513 
(Oct. 12, 1999). 
17 Article II, section 2 further provides “the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior 
officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of 
departments.” U.S. Const., art. II, § 2. 
18 The claim that the Senate is obligated to hold hearings is particularly anomalous as judicial 
confirmation hearings are a relatively modern invention. There was not even a Senate Judiciary 
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The only apparent obligation imposed by Article II is in the 
declaration that the president “shall” make a nomination. This is an 
instruction to the President, however, and not to the Senate. The 
appointments clause conditions appointment on Senate consent. It does not 
impose an affirmative duty to consider a nominee in any particular way. 
Understood in its historical context, it’s not even clear the 
appointments clause imposes an affirmative obligation on the President.19 
While it is common to read the word “shall” in statutes to indicate an 
affirmative duty, it is not clear the Constitution should be read this way.20 
“The widespread view in modern statutory interpretation that ‘shall’ 
expresses a mandatory command does not easily cohere with 18th century 
constitutional drafting and 18th century American-English usage,” argues 
Professor Seth Barrett Tillman.21 Rather, Professor Tillman maintains, the 
word “shall” is often used in the Constitution to allocate authority and 
indicate a temporal sequence, rather than to impose a duty.22  
The historical understanding of the Appointments Clause is 
consistent with this view. In Marbury v. Madison,23 for example, Chief 
Justice John Marshall characterized the President’s decision to nominate as 
“completely voluntary.”24 Marbury further characterized the subsequent 
appointment as “voluntary” as well, albeit contingent upon Senate “advice 
and consent.”25 This understanding is also consistent with that embraced by 
the Executive Branch, as represented by the opinions of the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel. In a 1999 memo discussing whether the 
President is obligated to appoint and commission an officer after the Senate 
has consented to the appointment, OLC concluded that all steps in the 
                                                 
Committee until 1816 and the first time a Supreme Court nominee was called to testify before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee was 1925, and the second was in 1939. See “Nominations,” U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Nominations.htm. 
19 See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 739, 
762 n.123 (1999) (“[T]he Appointments Clause is best read as a grant of power rather than an 
affirmative duty.”); 
20 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
112-15 (2012) (on distinction between “mandatory” and “permissive” words). 
21 Seth Barrett Tillman, Part I: Does the President Have A Duty To Nominate Supreme Court 
Candidates? Does the Senate Have A Duty To Consider Nominees?, THE NEW REFORM CLUB, (March 
18, 2016, 1:33 PM), http://reformclub.blogspot.com/2016/03/does-president-have-duty-to-
nominate.html; see also Nora Rotter Tillman & Seth Barrett Tillman, A Fragment on Shall and May, 50 
AMER. J. LEG. HIST. 453 (2010) 
22 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“[T]he Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, 
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall 
then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a 
President shall be elected.”). As Professor Tillman notes, it would be “odd” to maintain that the third 
use of “shall” in this clause imposes a mandatory duty. See Tillman, supra note __. See also U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 2 (indicating that the President “shall be” Commander in Chief and “shall have power” to make 
treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate). 
23  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
24 See id. at 155. 
25 Id. (appointment of an officer “is . . . a voluntary act, though it can only be performed by and with the 
advice and consent of the senate.”). 
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appointments process, including Senate advice and consent, are 
“discretionary.”26 Given this understanding, it should be no surprise that, 
throughout the nation’s history, Presidents have failed to make nominations 
to offices, including judgeships, covered by Article II, leaving such 
positions vacant and without any prospect for being filled. They have even 
delayed making nominations to the Supreme Court when vacancies have 
arisen shortly before an election.  
 Even if one were to conclude that Article II’s declaration that the 
President “shall” make a nomination to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court 
is mandatory, this is still insufficient to establish that the Senate has an 
affirmative obligation to take specific steps to consider the nomination. 
Under Article II, the Senate’s role in the appointment process is to provide 
“advice and consent” before an appointment may be made. It is 
indisputable that the Senate may withhold its consent, and there is nothing 
in the text of the Constitution that suggests the Senate’s failure to provide 
such consent must take any particular form. Much as the Senate may reject 
a legislative proposal that originated in the House of Representatives by 
voting it down, killing it in committee, or simply refusing to take up the 
measure, the Senate may withhold its consent by voting against 
confirmation of a nominee, rejecting the nomination in committee, or 
simply refusing to act.  
Other provisions of the Constitution reinforce the Senate’s 
prerogative. Article I, Section 5 states that “Each House may determine the 
rules of its proceedings.”27 This means that each house decides how to 
discharge its obligations, such as when and whether to rely upon 
committees or to impose specific procedural hurdles to final action. In the 
case of nominations, such hurdles for the consideration of judicial 
nominations have included allowing filibusters and sending nominations to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, where many judicial nominations have 
gone to die.28 As then-Senator Robert Byrd explained in a 2005 speech,  
 
There is no stipulation in the Constitution as to how the Senate is to express its 
advice or give its consent. . . the Constitution itself does not say that each 
nominee is entitled to an up or down vote. The Constitution doesn’t say that, it 
doesn’t even say that there has to be a vote with respect to the giving of its 
                                                 
26 See Appointment of a Senate-Confirmed Nominee, 23 Op. O.L.C. 232, 232, 1999 WL 33495513 
(Oct. 12, 1999). 
The Constitution thus calls for three steps before a presidential appointment is complete: 
first, the President’s submission of a nomination to the Senate; second, the Senate’s advice 
and consent; third, the President’s appointment of the officer, evidenced by the signing of the 
commission. All three of these steps are discretionary. 
27 U.S. Const., art I, §5. 
28 Some of those who now claim the Senate has an affirmative duty to actively consider a Supreme 
Court nomination have previously defended the use of filibusters to prevent votes on judicial nominees, 
even when deployed for partisan reasons. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, In Defense of 
Filibustering Judicial Nominations, 26 CARD. L. REV. 331 (2005). 
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consent. The Senate can refuse to confirm a nominee simply by saying nothing 
and doing nothing.29 
 
Nor does the Constitution identify any criteria which the Senate is required 
to consider (or ignore) when deciding whether to consent to a nomination. 
The history of the Appointments Clause confirms that Senate 
consent is a precondition for appointment, and not an affirmative duty. As 
documented by Adam J. White, the Constitution’s drafters based Article 
II’s appointment process on provisions in the Massachusetts Constitution of 
1780.30 Under the Massachusetts Constitution, however, it was common for 
the duty of “advice and consent” to be fulfilled by a refusal to consent, 
without any record of a vote or other formal action.31 Further, as White 
details, the framers expressly rejected a proposal put forward by none other 
than James Madison that would have imposed a duty on the Senate to 
affirmatively reject a nomination of which the Senate disapproved.32  
 The Constitution contains multiple provisions under which one 
constitutional actor must obtain the consent of another in exercising 
constitutional authority, yet none of these provisions has ever been 
understood to create a constitutional duty to act.33 So, for instance, if the 
House passes a bill to raise revenue, the Senate is under no obligation to 
take up the measure. It may reject it simply by refusing to act. Article II, 
section 2 provides that the President “shall have power, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of 
the Senators present concur,”34 and yet there is no constitutional obligation 
for the Senate to schedule a vote or hearing on any treaty the President 
submits. And so on. 
 The Constitution does, however, consider the potential 
consequences of inaction in at least one instance: Article I, section 7, which 
outlines the requirements for a bill to become a law.35 Under the normal 
course, once a bill has passed both houses of Congress, it is presented to the 
President. If the President signs the bill, it becomes a law. If, on the other 
hand, the President returns the bill with his objections—i.e. “vetoes” the 
bill—it does not become a law, unless the President’s objections are 
                                                 
29 Sen. Robert C. Byrd, A Special Presentation Broadcast Live on C-SPAN2: “Going Nuclear: The 
Threat to Our System of Checks and Balances” (April 25, 2005), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/kf/GoingNuclearTranscript.pdf  
 The text of these remarks were subsequently placed in the Congressional Record by then-
Senator Joseph Biden. See 151 CONG. REC. S4364 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2005)(statement of Sen. Biden). 
30 See Adam J. White, Toward the Framers' Understanding of Advice and Consent: An Historical and 
Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2005). 
31 Id. at 135-40. 
32 Id. at 141-46. 
33 See Amar, supra note __ (“If we look at other constitutional settings in which one entity must consent 
to the proposal of another actor before the proposal can take legal effect, we have as a general matter 
not inferred any duty on the part of the second actor to do anything.”). 
34 U.S. Const., art. II, § 2. 
35 U.S. Const., art. I, § 7. 
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overridden by a two-thirds vote in each house. In each of these cases, the 
President takes an affirmative step in response to the passage of a bill in 
Congress. But no affirmative step is required, and Article I, section 7 
expressly addresses that possibility. It provides that if a President fails to 
act in response to the presentment of a bill, and neither signs nor vetoes it, 
the bill may nonetheless become law after ten days (provided other 
conditions are not met).36 This suggests that if the framers understood the 
nomination of a justice to trigger an affirmative duty on the Senate to act—
either by voting to approve or reject that nominee—Article II would say so 
(and, indeed, James Madison had proposed just such an obligation37). 
Instead, it establishes Senate “consent” as a precondition for an 
appointment to the bench, and such consent may be withheld by refusing to 
act.  
A final point on the text. As noted above, the appointments clause 
in Article II makes no special provision for Supreme Court nominations. 
Rather, the reference to “Judges of the supreme Court” comes in the midst 
of other officers covered by the same clause, including “Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls, . . . and all other Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for.” Thus, 
if the text requires the Senate to actively consider nominations to the 
Supreme Court, that same text would seem to require identical 
consideration of nominees to other offices governed by this clause, and yet 
such a claim is nearly impossible to maintain. 
Neither the text nor the original understanding supports the claim 
that the Senate has an affirmative obligation to take any specific action in 
response to a Supreme Court nomination. If the proposition that the Senate 
has an affirmative obligation to consider a President’s Supreme Court 
nomination is to stand, that argument must rest upon other grounds—
grounds to which this essay now turns. 
 
II. STRUCTURE 
 
 Some have argued that the Senate’s failure to affirmatively 
consider a Supreme Court nomination is unconstitutional because it 
threatens the ability of the Court to function.38 While the text of the 
                                                 
36 Id.  
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it 
shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had 
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall 
not be a Law. 
37 See White, supra note __, at 141-47. 
38 For instance, at a recent debate on this question Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argued that the Senate has 
a constitutional obligation to act because “one branch can’t interfere with the functioning of another.” 
Erwin Chemerinsky and Michael Ramsey, Podcast, Does the Senate have a duty to hold hearings on 
Supreme Court nominees?, (Apr. 7, 2016), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2016/04/podcast-does-the-
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Constitution may not impose an affirmative duty, this argument goes, an 
affirmative duty exists nonetheless because the failure to act threatens to 
undermine the constitutional structure by threatening the ability of the 
federal judiciary to fulfill its constitutional role. This argument is no more 
convincing than appeals to the text. 
 Article III of the Constitution provides for a Supreme Court.39 It 
does not, however, provide for a set number of seats on the Court. There is 
no constitutional requirement that the Court have nine justices, or even an 
odd number. As originally constituted, there were six seats on the Court,40 
and federal law today still defines a quorum of the Court as six justices.41 
Refusing to fill a ninth seat may leave the Court deadlocked in a handful of 
cases—as may occur when a justice is required to recuse from a case—but 
it is hardly tantamount to eliminating the Supreme Court.42 Leaving the 
Court with an even number of justices may be inefficient or unwise, but it 
is hardly unconstitutional. Were it otherwise, the Senate’s obligation would 
extend to ensuring that each vacancy is filled—not merely that each 
nomination is considered—and such an obligation would eviscerate the 
Senate’s power to withhold “advice and consent.”  
 There is no question that Congress has the power to expand or 
reduce the size of the Court, and that this power could be used to impair the 
functioning of the Supreme Court and of lower courts.43 Dramatically 
reducing the number of lower courts would impair the functioning of the 
federal judiciary, but it would be constitutional.44 That the Senate’s power 
to consent—or withhold consent—to the filling of judicial vacancies 
imposes similar risks is insufficient to create a constitutional obligation to 
act in a particular way. Just as Congress regularly uses its power over 
appropriations to advance substantive policy goals, the Senate may use its 
advice and consent power to affect the size and functioning of the federal 
judiciary. That this power may be misused does not disprove the existence 
of the power. The same can be said for Congress’s power to enact other 
                                                 
senate-have-a-duty-to-hold-hearings-for-supreme-court-nominees/; see also Minow & Tacha, supra 
note __. 
39 See U.S. Const., art. III. 
40 Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 1 Cong. Ch. 20, Sec. 1. 
41 28 U.S.C. § 1 (“The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United 
States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”). 
42 Justice Elena Kagan was required to recuse in twenty-nine cases during her first term on the Court. 
This amounted to over one-third of the Court’s docket, and yet the Court still functioned. See Kedar 
Bhatia, Final October Term 2010 Stat Pack,,SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 27, 2011, 5:43 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/final-october-term-2010-stat-pack-available/. 
43 See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803) (upholding the Repeal Act of Mar. 8, 1802 which abolished 
numerous federal judgeships). 
44 I leave aside the question whether it would be constitutional for the Senate to permanently refuse to 
fill any Supreme Court vacancy. There is an argument such an action would violate Article III, which 
provides that there must be a Supreme Court. In the present instance, however, all that is at issue is 
whether the Senate is acting unconstitutionally by refusing to consider a single Supreme Court 
nomination for a limited period of time. 
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regulations governing the functioning of the judiciary. Some such 
regulations may enhance the judiciary’s ability to function, while others 
may impair it. Regulations of the latter sort are not inherently 
unconstitutional. As Justice Joseph Story warned: 
 
It is always a doubtful course to argue against the use or existence of a power 
from the possibility of its abuse. It is still more difficult by such an argument to 
ingraft upon a general power a restriction which is not to be found in the terms in 
which it is given.45 
 
 Even those who argue that the Senate has an obligation to consider 
nominations recognize that the Senate may exercise this power to refuse to 
confirm a President’s nominees, or block their consideration by the full 
Senate.46 One way for the Senate to refuse consent is to vote against 
nominees. This power is just as prone to misuse as the power to refuse to 
consider a nomination. A seat on the Supreme Court remains open today 
because the Senate has refused to act. In the past, however, seats have 
remained open because the Senate refused to confirm a President’s 
nominees. When Associate Justice Abe Fortas stepped down in May 1969 
under a cloud of scandal, it would be a full year before his replacement was 
confirmed as the Senate rejected President Richard Nixon’s first two 
nominees for the seat (Clement Haynsworth and Harold Carswell) before 
confirming Harry Blackmun.47  
President John Tyler had it far worse than President Nixon. In the 
1840s, the Senate rejected several of Tyler’s nominees to the Supreme 
Court, leaving a seat vacant for over 800 days.48 Among those rejected was 
Rueben Walworth, whose nomination was withdrawn (twice!) when the 
Senate refused to consider it.49 The Senate’s response to President Tyler’s 
nominations may have been imprudent or unstatesmanlike, but it was 
hardly unconstitutional. The same can be said of the Senate’s refusal to 
consider a nomination. Likewise, many would suggest that the Senate’s 
recurring failure to act on nominations to fill lower court vacancies, 
particularly where “judicial emergencies” have been declared, impairs the 
                                                 
45 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 344-45 (1816). 
46 See, e.g. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note __. 
47 See Henry B. Hogue, Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-August 2010,  Congressional 
Research Service, August 20, 2010, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31171.pdf; Harry A. Blackmun, 
1970-1994, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 
http://supremecourthistory.org/timeline_blackmun.html  
48 See Biden, supra note __, at 16310 (noting “a seat remained vacant for 28 months”); Drew Desilver, 
Long Supreme Court vacancies used to be more common, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Feb. 26, 2016, 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/26/long-supreme-court-vacancies-used-to-be-more-
common/ 
49 See ARTEMUS WARD, CHRISTOPHER BROUGH, ROBERT ARNOLD, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT 536 (2015). 
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functioning of the judiciary.50 This does not, however, mean that the Senate 
is acting unconstitutionally when it reaches a different judgment about the 
advisability of filling a given judicial vacancy or otherwise withholds its 
consent. 
 
III. HISTORY  
 
 Recognizing that neither the text nor structure of the Constitution is 
sufficient to impose a constitutional obligation on the Senate to consider a 
President’s Supreme Court nomination, some have argued that such an 
obligation may be derived from the history of judicial nominations.51 It is 
widely accepted that consistent practice may inform the resolution of 
constitutional questions.52 Thus, if the Senate were to have a long, 
unbroken practice of considering judicial nominations in a particular 
fashion, there would be a colorable argument that this practice has a 
constitutional dimension, and that the failure to abide by this practice is 
tantamount to violation of a constitutional duty.53 Yet no such historical 
norm exists. 
 There is a long history of Senate refusal to fill judicial vacancies, 
including by a simple refusal to consider Presidential nominees. As 
summarized by the Congressional Research Service: 
From the appointment of the first Justices in 1789 through its consideration of 
nominee Elena Kagan in 2010, the Senate has confirmed 124 Supreme Court 
nominations out of 160 received. Of the 36 nominations which were not 
confirmed, 11 were rejected outright in roll-call votes by the Senate, while nearly 
all of the rest, in the face of substantial committee or Senate opposition to the 
nominee or the President, were withdrawn by the President, or were postponed, 
tabled, or never voted on by the Senate.54 
                                                 
50 See Russell Wheeler & Sarah Binder, Do Judicial Emergencies Matter? Nomination and 
Confirmation Delay during the 111th Congress, Brookings Institution, Feb. 16, 2011, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/do-judicial-emergencies-matter-nomination-and-confirmation-
delay-during-the-111th-congress/; Alicia Bannon, The Impact of Judicial Vacancies on Federal Trial 
Courts, Brennan Center for Justice, July 21, 2014, https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/impact-
judicial-vacancies-federal-trial-courts. For a current listing of judicial emergencies, see 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies.  
51 See, e.g., Gans, supra note __; Stone, supra note __. 
52 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S (4 Wheat) 316, 401 (1819) (noting that precise contours of each 
branch’s powers may be defined and clarified by practice). Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“a systemic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by 
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power 
part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive power’ vested in the 
Presidency by § 1 of Art. II.”). 
53 Consistent practice, by itself, is not necessarily sufficient to create a constitutional limitation or rule.  
For instance, prior to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, no President had ever sought re-election for a 
third consecutive term. It was nonetheless perfectly constitutional for FDR to seek a third and fourth 
term. Turning the two-consecutive-term norm into a constitutional rule required a constitutional 
amendment. See U.S. Const., amend XXII. 
54 See Barry J. McMillion, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Senate Debate and Confirmation Vote, 
CRS Report for Congress R44234, Oct. 19, 2015. The report also notes that “Six of the unconfirmed 
nominations, however, involved individuals who subsequently were re-nominated and confirmed.” Id. 
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Most Supreme Court nominees have been confirmed, but there is nothing 
approaching an unbroken practice of confirmation, or even of active 
consideration of nominees. This is particularly so when one considers lower 
courts.55 Looking more broadly at all nominations covered by Article II, 
one finds an even more widespread practice of a failure to act on 
Presidential nominees. As Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell has 
documented, positions subject to Senate confirmation have been “empty (or 
filled by acting officials), on average, one quarter of the time” during the 
administrations of President Jimmy Carter through President George W. 
Bush.56 
As judicial confirmation fights have escalated over the past three 
decades, it has become increasingly common for the Senate to refuse to 
consider judicial nominations made during an election year.57 In April 
1988, for example, President Ronald Reagan nominated Judith Richards 
Hope to an open seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.58 
She never received a hearing, let alone a vote. As both the Washington 
Post and New York Times reported at the time, the reasons were simple: 
Senate Democrats did not want to allow a Republican president to alter the 
balance of an important court in the year before an election.59 
 Many nominations made within a year of the next presidential 
election suffered a similar fate. John Roberts, for example, was first 
nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in January 
1992, and the Senate took no action on his nomination.60 The same was true 
for University of Virginia law professor Lillian BeVier who was nominated 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in October 1991.61 
Professor BeVier was the first full-time female faculty member at UVA’s 
law school and a prominent constitutional law scholar, but she never 
received a hearing, let alone a vote. District court judge Terrence Boyle was 
also nominated in 1991 and did not receive a hearing either.62 These were 
                                                 
55 See, e.g., Denis Steven Rutkus & Kevin M. Scott, Nomination and Confirmation of Lower Federal 
Court Judges in Presidential Election Years, CRS Report for Congress RL34615, Aug. 13, 2008. 
56 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices; Delays in Staffing top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 913, 914 (2009). 
57 See Carl Tobias, Filling Federal Court Vacancies in a Presidential Election Year, 50 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 35, 35 (2015) (noting widespread understanding that “confirmations slow and ultimately halt over 
presidential election years”). 
58 See Hope In-Law for Bork Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1988, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/15/us/hope-in-law-for-bork-seat.html.  
59 See Saundra Torry, D.C. Lawyer’s Nomination to Court of Appeals Appears Stalled, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 9, 1988, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1988/09/09/dc-lawyers-nomination-to-
court-of-appeals-appears-stalled/b8e4df04-2cf4-4eb9-9c8d-fbc2c569f171/; Susan F. Rasky and Linda 
Greenhouse, Washington Talk: Briefing; A Second Chance?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1988, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/18/us/washington-talk-briefing-a-second-chance.html. 
60 See Unsuccessful Nominations and Recess Appointments, Federal Judicial Center, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_nominations.html. (Charting the history of 
unsuccessful nominations by presidency). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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not isolated examples. Over the past few decades, dozens of judicial 
nominations have been defeated by the Senate’s simple refusal to take any 
formal action before the end of a President’s term.63 Further, as the 
Congressional Research Service has noted, one common reason for Senate 
refusal to act is the Senate majority’s desire to leave seats open so that they 
may be filled by the next occupant of the White House.64 
The Senate’s recent history of refusing to consider judicial 
nominations made within a year of a pending Presidential election is largely 
confined to lower court nominees. Supreme Court nominations are much 
more rare, and election-year nominations are rarer still. Prior to Justice 
Scalia’s death, the opportunity to make a Supreme Court nomination in a 
presidential election year had only arisen twice since World War II. In 
neither case, however, was there a confirmation prior to the election. 
Most recently, in 1968, Chief Justice Earl Warren announced his 
intention to resign upon the confirmation of his successor. President 
Lyndon Johnson’s decision to nominate Associate Justice Abe Fortas to be 
Chief Justice (and nomination of Homer Thornberry to fill Justice Fortas’s 
seat) was controversial for many reasons, including “the propriety of a 
lameduck nomination.”65 Opposition to confirming Fortas was bipartisan. 
While Southern Democrats opposed his record supporting civil rights, other 
Senators were concerned about his alleged ethical improprieties, and others 
did not like the idea of filling a Supreme Court seat on the eve of an 
election.66 Senator Robert Griffin, for example, declared there was “ample 
precedent” for the position that “the opportunity to make such nominations 
at this particular point in time should be reserved for the new President 
soon to be elected by the people,” even if “for purely political reasons.”67 In 
the end, the Fortas nomination was defeated (and the Thornberry 
nomination along with it) when a cloture vote failed.  
In September 1956, Justice Sherman Minton left the Court due to 
ill health. President Dwight Eisenhower filled the vacancy with the recess 
appointment of William Brennan, a Democrat. In January, after his re-
election, President Eisenhower nominated Brennan to fill the empty seat, 
and the Senate confirmed him by a voice vote in March.68 Although 
Eisenhower had not sought to fill the position permanently on the eve of the 
                                                 
63 See Rutkus & Scott, supra note __. 
64 Id.at 45-46. 
65 See Biden, supra note __, at S8853, S8857. 
66 Id at S8862. (“And the 1968 filibuster against Abe Fortas' nomination—an assault that was launched 
by 19 Republican Senators, before President Johnson had even named Fortas as his selection—is 
similarly well known by all who follow this.” (emphasis added)); see also White, supra note __ 
(quoting Senator Majority Leader George Mitchell). 
67 See White, supra note __.  
68 See William J. Brennan, Jr., 1956-1990, SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 
http://supremecourthistory.org/timeline_brennan.html. 
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election—and picked someone of the opposite political party—it was still 
controversial. In 1960, the Senate passed a resolution opposing the use of 
recess appointments to fill Supreme Court vacancies.69 
The last time a Supreme Court vacancy arose in an election year 
and was filled prior to the election was in 1932, when the Senate confirmed 
Benjamin Cardozo to fill the seat vacated by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.70 Facing a Senate that was split down the middle, and an 
impending election, President Herbert Hoover, a Republican, decided to 
nominate a prominent Democrat to fill the seat.  
In June 1992, when considering the possibility of an election-year 
vacancy to the Supreme Court, then-Senator Joseph Biden spoke on the 
Senate floor of “the tradition against acting on Supreme court nominations 
in a Presidential year.”71 In extended remarks, the then-Chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee reviewed the history of Supreme Court 
nomination fights, explained why he believed Senate Democrats would be 
justified in delaying action on any prospective Supreme Court nominee 
should a vacancy occur prior to the election, and discussed how the Senate 
and President should work together on future Supreme Court nominations 
in future years. Senator Biden argued that should there be a Supreme Court 
vacancy that year, the President “should consider following the practice of 
a majority of his predecessors and not—and not—name a nominee until 
after the November election is completed.”72 He added further that were 
such a nomination made, and the President were to “go[] the way of 
Presidents Fillmore and Johnson” and “press[] an election year nomination, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee should seriously consider not scheduling 
confirmation hearings on the nomination until after the campaign season is 
over.”73 Senator Biden further noted that “no Justice has ever been 
confirmed in September or October of an election year—the sort of timing 
which has become standard in the modern confirmation process.”74 
 Then-Senator Biden no doubt overstated the existence of a 
meaningful tradition against confirming Supreme Court justices in election 
years. There is no such meaningful tradition, but nor is there a meaningful 
tradition of filling Supreme Court vacancies that arise in election years 
either. In some cases, Presidents have refrained from making such 
                                                 
69 See S. 334, 86th Cong. (1960).  
70 See John Anthony Maltese, The Long History of Presidents Nominating Supreme Court Justices in 
Presidential Election Years, THE COOK POLITICAL REPORT, (Feb. 15, 2016), 
http://cookpolitical.com/story/9260. 
 Justice Pierce Butler left the Court within twelve months of a presidential election, but not in 
an election year. He stepped down in November 1939. The Senate confirmed Justice Frank Murphy to 
replace Butler in 1940. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at S8853. 
 
 
Adler – No Obligation – GEO. MASON L. REV. 
appointments until after the election. In other cases, when nominations 
were made, the Senate refused to act prior to voters casting their ballots. 
Where the Senate responded quickly to pre-election nominations, it has 
usually been when the Senate majority and the President were of the same 
political party and the overall balance of the Court was not at stake. 
All told, there have been 15 occasions in which a vacancy arose in 
an election year, defined as a vacancy that occurred within a year prior to 
the election.75 Only seven of these vacancies were filled by a nominee 
confirmed by the Senate prior to the election.76 In two others, a president’s 
election year nominees were confirmed after the election, but in both of 
these cases the nomination was not made until after the election either (and 
in one, the nominee was the sixth sent up for that seat). The remaining 
vacancies were not filled until later, usually by subsequent presidents. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy was confirmed in a presidential election year, 
1988, although the vacancy arose and his nomination was first made in 
1987, after two prior nominations had failed.77 In sum, there are too few 
instances of election-year vacancies upon which to build any claim of 
historical practice, in either direction, let alone the sort of unbroken 
                                                 
75 The fifteen vacancies were: as follows  
 Sept. 30, 1800, filled on Jan 27, 1801  by John Marshall; 
 Jan. 26, 1804, filled on Mar 24, 1804 by William Johnson; 
 Aug. 25, 1828, filled on Mar 7, 1829 by John McLean; 
 Dec. 18, 1843, filled on Feb 14, 1845 by Samuel Nelson; 
 Apr. 21, 1844, filled on Aug 4, 1846 by Robert Cooper Grier; 
 July 19, 1852, filled on Mar 22, 1853 by John Archibald Campbell; 
 May 31, 1860, filled on  Jul 16, 1862 by Samuel Freeman Miller; 
 Oct. 12, 1864, filled on Dec 6, 1864 by Salmon Chase; 
 Mar. 23, 1888, filled on Jul 20, 1888 by Melville Fuller; 
 Jan. 22, 1892, filled on Jul 26, 1892 by George Shiras Jr.; 
 Jan. 2, 1916, filled on Jun 1, 1916 by Louis Brandeis; 
 June 10, 1916, filled on Jul 24, 1916 by John Hessin Clarke; 
 Jan. 12, 1932, filled on Feb 24, 1932 by Benjamin Cardozo; 
 Nov. 16, 1939, filled on Jan 16, 1940 by Frank Murphy; 
 Oct .15, 1956, filled on Mar 19, 1957 by William Brennan. 
See Jonathan H. Adler, In election years, a (spotty) history of confirming court nominees, WASH POST, 
Feb. 16, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/17/in-election-
years-a-spotty-history-of-confirming-court-nominees/; Timeline of the Justices, THE SUPREME COURT 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://supremecourthistory.org/history_timeline.html; Supreme Court 
Nominations, present-1789, United States Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm 
76 The seven nominees approved prior to the election were: Johnson, Fuller, Shiras, Brandeis, Clarke, 
Cardozo, and Murphy. See id. 
77 President Ronald Reagan first nominated Judge Robert Bork to replace the Justice Lewis Powell. 
After the Senate rejected Bork’s nomination, Reagan nominated Judge Douglas Ginsburg, but Judge 
Ginsburg withdrew his nomination after only a few days, and before his nomination was formally 
submitted to the Senate. Although Powell stepped down in June 1987, the approaching presidential 
election and the potential for his replacement to alter the balance of the Court, made the confirmation 
process for his successor more contentious than it might otherwise have been. As then-Senator Joseph 
Biden would recount in 1992, many “questioned our committee’s ability to fairly process the Bork 
nomination—a year before the 1988 campaign—without becoming entangled in Presidential politics.” 
See Biden, supra note __, at S8862. 
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tradition that could ripen into a constitutional norm obligating the Senate to 
act. 
 In an extensive and thoughtful article, Professors Robin Bradley 
Kar and Jason Mazzone argue that the Senate majority’s refusal to consider 
the Garland nomination is historically unprecedented and violates a 
longstanding “historical rule” governing nominations: 
 
whenever a Supreme Court vacancy has existed during an elected President’s 
term and the President has acted prior to the election of a successor, the sitting 
President has been able to both nominate and appoint someone to fill the relevant 
vacancy, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.78 
 
The gerrymandered formulation of this rule–which seems to imply the 
Senate must confirm, and not merely consider, a nominee—should be 
sufficient to demonstrate that there is no constitutional norm with regard to 
Senate conduct, and certainly no norm requiring affirmative consideration 
of a nominee.79  
In order to determine whether there is constitutional norm 
governing Supreme Court nominations, one cannot consider Senate conduct 
in isolation. After all, as Kar and Mazzone note, the process necessarily 
involves engagement between the executive and legislative branch. Thus, 
one would have to consider the possibility of a norm of Senate conduct in 
conjunction with the possibility of a norm of presidential conduct, such as a 
norm against forwarding nominations to fill vacancies that arise in an 
election year prior to an election when the Senate is controlled by the 
opposition party.  
Kar and Mazzone discount the Senate’s rejection of Fortas 
(because there was no actual vacancy) and place substantial emphasis on 
the fact that the Senate has most commonly rejected election-year 
nominations when the President obtained office by succession. Yet they do 
not consider what effect (if any) the adoption of presidential term limits 
should have on the analysis (insofar as it creates the possibility of lame-
duck nominations by Presidents who are no longer politically accountable 
to the electorate) and fail to consider what relevance, if any, the practice of 
many Presidents to defer making a nomination until after the intervening 
election should have on the analysis. The point here, again, is not that there 
is a precedent in support of the Senate’s current obstruction. There is not. 
Instead, the point is far more modest—that there is no countervailing 
constitutional norm that could support any claim of constitutional 
obligation. 
                                                 
78 Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution Really 
Say about President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 53, 62-63 (2016). 
79 For a critique, see White, supra note __. 
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 Any attempt to argue that there is a constitutional norm sufficient 
to create a constitutional obligation for the Senate to act to confirm an 
election year nomination is plagued by the problem that there are so few 
cases to examine. As already noted, the death of Justice Scalia created the 
first election-year vacancy in over fifty years. Skipping over the Fortas 
nomination, the last time a President made a nomination to fill an election 
year vacancy was in 1940, when the White House and Congress were 
aligned and there was no prospect of a confirmation altering the balance of 
the Court. 
 While there are relatively few instances in which the Senate 
considered a President’s nominee to fill a Supreme Court vacancy that 
arose during an election year, there are numerous examples of the Senate 
refusing to confirm—indeed, even refusing to consider—a President’s 
nominees to lower courts when the nominations were made during an 
election year. A few of these were discussed above. Kar and Mazzone 
discount the relevance of these nominations, however, arguing that the 
Supreme Court is different. They write:  
 
Federal judges are not inferior officers and they have Article III protections. 
These appointments are nevertheless distinguishable from Supreme Court 
appointments because the Constitution creates the Supreme Court whereas lower 
federal courts are created by legislative act. Once again, Congress’s greater power 
to create or extinguish lower courts therefore arguably includes the lesser power 
to allow the Senate to let certain late appointments to those courts lapse shortly 
before a presidential transition. However, the Supreme Court remains distinct.80 
 
Here Kar and Mazzone seek to manufacture a distinction that simply does 
not exist in the Constitution. As noted above, individual seats on the 
Supreme Court are as much a creature of “legislative act” as are lower 
federal courts. If Congress’s power to extinguish seats on lower courts 
means the Senate may choose “to let certain late appointments to those 
courts lapse shortly before a presidential transition,” there is no reason why 
this would not apply to the ninth seat on the Supreme Court.81 
 The long and short of this analysis is that there is no well-
established tradition of successful nominations to fill judicial vacancies in 
election years. There are few such instances, and none in the modern era on 
all fours with the present. If anything, there is a tradition of seeking to 
avoid this scenario. Again, the claim is not that precedent supports the 
refusal to consider a replacement for Justice Scalia prior to the election. 
                                                 
80 See Kar & Mazzone, supra note __, at 95. 
81 Professor Tillman would go farther and challenge the claim that Congress’s power to control the size 
of the Court includes the “lesser” power to hold a seat open, as the two powers are exercised by 
different entities. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Part IV: Why Senate Inaction As A Response To A 
Presidential Nomination Is Constitutional, THE NEW REFORM CLUB, (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:50 PM), 
http://reformclub.blogspot.com/2016/04/part-4-why-senate-inaction-as-response.html. The bottom-line 
point remains the same, however, as this applies equally to the Supreme Court and the lower courts. 
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Rather, the claim is that there is no well-established precedent—and 
nothing remotely resembling a constitutional norm——to the contrary. 
 
ESCAPING THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL 
 
 Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s announcement that he 
would refuse to consider any nomination to replace Justice Antonin Scalia 
prior to the 2016 election did not occur in a vacuum. Although 
unprecedented (and, in my view, unwarranted), it occurred against a 
backdrop of ever increasing polarization and conflict in the judicial 
nomination process. 
 Since the mid-1980s, the judicial confirmation process has been in 
a downward spiral of increasing obstruction and dysfunction.82 Over this 
period, each side has engaged in an escalating game of tit-for-tat, using 
Senate majorities (and, sometimes, Senate minorities) to block the 
confirmation of highly qualified judicial nominees, including by refusing to 
consider nominations, particularly when such nominations occurred in 
election years. Senate Republicans may have been particularly 
obstructionist of President Obama’s judicial nominees, retaliating for 
Democratic obstruction of Republican nominees, and then some. The same 
could be said of Senate Democrats’ treatment of Bush nominees, 
Republican treatment of Clinton nominees and so on.  
 Asserting that the Senate has some form of constitutional 
obligation to act on a judicial nominee amounts to an effort to break the 
logjam by playing a trump card. It is as if to say that prior obstruction was 
acceptable (if regrettable) but this time—this time—a constitutional rule 
has been violated. If only it were so. As the above examination of text, 
structure, and historical precedent seeks to show, there is no constitutional 
obligation for the Senate to consider a presidential nomination to the 
Supreme Court. There are strong political and prudential arguments for 
prompt consideration of all nominees, but not particularly strong 
constitutional ones. 
Ending the ever-worsening conflict over judicial nominations will 
not be achieved by playing an imaginary constitutional trump. Rather, it 
will occur when the competing sides of this conflict are willing to recognize 
the harm this conflict does to the judiciary, and the importance of a more 
regular and rational confirmation process. It will also likely occur only 
when each side is willing to engage in compromise. In short, the answer to 
the judicial confirmation mess lies in politics, and not in overstated appeals 
to constitutional principle. 
                                                 
82 Credit for the characterization of the increasing politicization and obstruction goes to Larry Solum. 
See Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology versus Character, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 659, 661 
(2005)(“ Recent events, particularly the filibuster of several judicial nominees and the use of the recess 
appointments power to circumvent the filibusters, may constitute a downward spiral of politicization.”). 
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